Measured one at a time
Yardland lists .onion services run by real, identifiable organisations — newspapers, whistleblowing platforms, privacy projects, archives. Every address here was published by the organisation itself, and every one was checked to see whether it actually answers. Each entry shows its own evidence.
The short version, before the directory.
A yardland was a medieval English measure of land — a quarter of a hide, the acreage a team of two oxen could plough in a season. It was primarily a measure of assessment rather than area. Someone walked the ground, checked the boundaries, and wrote down what was actually there. Yardland takes its name from the measuring, not the land.
Finding a legitimate onion service is oddly hard. Search engines on the Tor network are unfiltered, so the real thing sits beside phishing clones of itself. Link lists go stale within weeks. And organisations retire onion services without updating the page that announced them, so their own documentation keeps pointing at addresses that no longer answer. A directory is only useful if someone re-checks it.
So that is all Yardland does. It does not crawl the onion web and it does not index it. For each entry it records who published the address, what kind of proof that is, and what happened when we tried to reach it.
No keyword index, no crawling, no results page. If you want to search the onion web, that is a different tool with different problems.
A list is a claim with no date on it. Every entry here carries its provenance and the result of its last liveness check.
Nobody can pay, petition or post their way in. An address is listed only if the organisation publishes it and it can be independently confirmed.
Two kinds of evidence are accepted. A third is explicitly rejected.
Their own HTTPS website tells Tor Browser that an onion version exists — either with an
Onion-Location response header, or with an equivalent <meta>
tag. This is a live assertion from the organisation itself, which makes it the strongest
signal available. It is also the only kind that cannot quietly go stale, because it is
served fresh with every visit.
The address appears somewhere on the organisation's own domain — documentation, a blog post, a support page. Still first-party, but unchecked by design: nobody updates those pages when a service is retired. Tier 2 entries are therefore always liveness-tested before they appear, and all three of Yardland's unreachable findings came from this tier or from a stale tag.
Forums, aggregators, other directories, someone's summary blog post. Not accepted, ever. An address that only exists because a third party copied it is exactly how phishing addresses get laundered into looking official.
Two labels look similar and mean opposite things. Conflating them is how a directory starts lying to people.
24 entries across 9 categories. Every address below was re-probed in a single serial pass through Tor, most recently 11 October 2026, 00:34 UTC — each entry states when it was checked and what happened. Addresses are shown as plain text and are deliberately not hyperlinked here. Clicking an onion link in an ordinary browser can leak a DNS lookup and rarely works anyway — copy the address into Tor Browser instead.
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
ADVERTISED-BUT-UNREACHABLE: the organisation still serves this address, but Tor cannot reach the service. Report upstream.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
Advertised with a 'www.' hostname prefix; confirmed to resolve correctly over Tor (strict 56-char validators false-positive here).
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location. Docs pages are not updated when a service is retired, so tier-2 addresses must be liveness-gated before publication.
Address published on the org's own domain but NOT advertised via Onion-Location.
An address being here is not an endorsement. Yardland records who published an address and whether it answered. It does not vouch for what a service does, who runs it, or whether it is safe. Verify anything important out of band — ideally against a signature the organisation publishes elsewhere.
A listing is a snapshot, not a guarantee. The onion web changes daily. Every check is timestamped; treat the timestamp as the expiry on the claim.
Addresses are cryptographic. A v3 onion address is the service's public key. You cannot tell a real address from a fake one by looking — real and fake are equally random strings. That is why provenance, not appearance, is the only real defence, and it is the thing this site actually checks.